The Connection Between Fragility And Failure In Iraq..& Way Out Strategies

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The Connection Between Fragility And Failure In Iraq

&

Way Out Strategies

 

DR. Rana Khalid 

Senior Researchers

IFPMC-LONDON

APRIL 2022

 

 

 

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the connection between corruption and failure in iraq (1)

 

 

 

Introduction

 

Strong states are similar in their strength and capabilities in influencing and expressing strength, but failed states, even if they start out, are similar in their features, but the factors of weakness and failure vary from one state to another. In fact, each of the failed states bears a special characteristic of failure that differs from the other[1].

Iraq, according to the standards of international organizations and institutions, is considered one of the fragile and high-risk countries, and it also does not have stable and sustainable plans and strategies to address the factors of fragility. Therefore, it has shifted from a state of fragility to a state of failure and it is at a dangerous crossroads, all of which end with the fact that Iraq has become unable to bring about development for a period long time[2].

Did the factors of fragility lead Iraq to failure, or did the failed state lead to the exacerbation of the factors of fragility in Iraq?

This paper will shed light on the idea of ​​fragility and failure in Iraq. What is the concept of fragility, and what is its relationship to failure and how does it interact in Iraq? More importantly, are there solutions that policy makers in Iraq can use if they have a desire to get Iraq out of the valley of failed states?

 

1-Concepts of fragility and failure

Fragile or failing?

Countries are classified as Fragile State based on definitions of international organizations and institutions that have established standard bases for determining fragility. The criteria for fragility were often considered the same as the criteria for a failed state, but researchers in the field of development stressed the need to differentiate between the two terms, as they are still mixed and not precisely defined, in addition to the overlap of the political, economic and social factors that define them[3].

With regard to fragility, there are many definitions of a fragile state, including what went to define a weak or fragile state in terms of functionality, which was followed by the definitions of the International Monetary Fund, which defined it by defining its opposite, the active state, which he describes as: “a state capable of performing ten main functions; Chiefly the classic function of the state, which is the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence or coercion within society. Later, it has the functions of rationally managing the state’s public financial resources, investing in human capital, managing infrastructure services in the state, as well as the function of enforcing the rule of law, and the submission of the ruling elite. The same applies to the rule of law, and how the ruling elite manages the capabilities of the state. The functional state is the one whose mechanisms work efficiently at the individual and collective levels. In contrast, a “fragile state” is defined according to the previous understanding of the International Monetary Fund as: a state that does not provide the services required of it to its population effectively, in one or more of the aforementioned functions[4].

There are those who defined the fragile state depending on the risks and weaknesses, and this is what the Organization for International Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) went to, which defined the fragile state as the state that has weak capabilities to perform basic governance functions and lacks the ability to develop mutual constructive relations with society. Failed regions or states are also considered more vulnerable to internal or external shocks, such as economic crises or natural disasters. In 2020, the OECD added the Covid-19 variable as a critical element in measuring the fragility of the country and its ability to deal with the consequences of the pandemic[5].

The previous definition corresponds to a large extent with the definition of the World Bank, where it defines a fragile state as a country that faces severe development challenges that are summarized in weak institutional capacities, poor governance and governance, and political instability. The definition also adds the factors of continuous violence and conflicts, which are often unfinished historical conflicts.

World Bank experts go to define fragile states through identical standard factors, such as:

– low income

Rating score of around 3.2 or less[6].

Countries where CPIA indicators are not available

– Presence of peacekeeping forces during

Countries for which no CPIA data is available. Countries are considered “essential” fragile states.

In addition to the official international organizations, independent organizations have sought to fill the gaps in the classification of fragile states that permeated the definitions of these international organizations. Foreign Policy magazine cooperated with Fand For Peace FFP to issue the annual Fragile States Index (FSI), which ranks countries on the basis of 12 factors measuring fragility and failure. The FSI has become an important tool for measuring not only the criteria of fragile and failed states, but As well as measuring all forms of pressures faced by all countries of the world and measuring the extent to which these pressures exceed the ability of countries to manage and deal with them, and thus it is considered an important source for identifying weaknesses and weaknesses that can affect the fragility of countries and thus provides an early warning to policy makers and specialists to address these imbalances before To turn into disasters that threaten the stability of countries[7]. In highlighting not only the normal pressures that all countries face, but also in identifying when those pressures exceed the ability of countries to manage those pressures. By highlighting relevant vulnerabilities that contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index – and the social science framework and data analysis tools on which it is based – makes political risk assessment and conflict early warning accessible to policy makers and the public[8].

One of the important indicators of fragility and weakness prepared by independent institutions is the QoG Quality of Governance Index

which sets standards for trustworthy, non-corrupt, impartial, and effective government institutions[9]. This indicator is based on measuring the quality of governance in public institutions in countries.

As for the failed state, it is the state that failed to confront the factors of fragility. Therefore, the two concepts are mixed by many researchers and the borders between them become overlapping. In terms of political philosophy, the term is very deep and may take us to wide dimensions that reach the depth of the idea of ​​failure This is what made Noam Chomsky in the book The Failed State classifies the United States as a failed state in terms of its inability to control its deep tendency towards control by using wars and conflicts[10]. Therefore, the focus was on the failed state in terms of development science, which is the path that started since the end of World War II, where scholars and researchers focused on the extent to which countries are able to bring about development and development and to challenge the political, economic and social conditions in creating a developed state capable of meeting the needs of citizens. This functional criterion is important not only for classifying the country among the countries of the world, but also because it puts before the policy makers in the concerned country the aspects that must be taken into account in planning to revive development, pull the country out of its deteriorating reality, and find policies and solutions to end crises.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that measuring fragility and failure is a process that is subject to various and varied criteria, and that international efforts are still developing in the field of defining deeper and more specific criteria for fragility and weakness in countries. The biggest problem that these indicators or those international organizations concerned with measuring the level of failure and fragility in the world suffer from is the absence or inaccuracy of data received from those weak countries. Countries that suffer mainly from weak institutions, as is the case in Iraq, Syria, Yemen or Libya, how It has to produce efficient data and it originally does not have an updated or developed database capable of accurately measuring the factors. These institutions deliberately falsify or manipulate numbers and data in order to protect governments accountability and accountability. In many countries of the world corruption penetrates into planning and monitoring bodies, whether governmental or even Civil society organizations and in other countries there is complete ignorance of the factors that must be monitored and evaluated. Even if we assume that individuals and independent researchers are trained to collect accurate data, these individual researches may be unable to access government data or be misled by marginal data.

 

2-The state of fragility and failure in Iraq

 

With regard to Iraq, it has become one of the most important models of fragility and failure, not only because of the danger of this fragility to peace-building and development in Iraq, but also the danger of this fragility to regional and international peace, as the deterioration of institutions and development programs and the deepening of corruption and political instability have made Iraq one of the most important addresses of international crises such as The crisis of global terrorism and the crisis of refugees fleeing to Europe, and consequently, the fragility and failure in Iraq did not threaten the interior, but rather it became a source of creating major global threats.

In the Iraqi case, fragility and failure draw a tight circular scheme in the sense that the factors of fragility have accumulated for a long time and led to the transformation of Iraq into a failed state after decision-makers were unable to draw up a strategy to address fragility, sometimes unwilling and unable at other times due to regional and international pressures that made them executives. They are controlled by international and regional powers rather than independent decision makers. The lack of independence in decision-making or the presence of external interventions that affect the political decision is one of the most important factors of failure that characterize the concept of a failed state[11].

Iraq is classified as a high fragility country, Figure 1 The state of fragility in Iraq

Source[12]: OESD

 

Figure 1

 

According to the Fragile Statas Index 2021, Iraq is among the twenty most fragile countries in the world, ranking 20th in 2021, after being ranked 17th in 2019, rising only two places[13]. Figure 2

 

Figure 2

 

Although there is a noticeable improvement in the situation of fragility compared to 2006[14], as in Figure 4, this improvement is slow and still not enough to consolidate real steps in strengthening the situation of fragility. Indeed, Iraq is still exposed to violent shocks that could return it to dangerous conditions. It threatens the temporary improvements witnessed in the last five years.

 

Levels of fragility in Iraq from 2006-2021
Figure 3

 

If we pass the Iraqi situation on the previously mentioned criteria on which the international community organizations were based, we can identify the most important factors that build the reality of the fragile state in Iraq, which are as follows:

 

First: sustainable conflict

The conflict in Iraq is a deep crisis and a threat to all forms of development. These conflicts that Iraq has gone through entail human and economic costs. Therefore, Iraq has witnessed sharp economic and development declines accompanied by sharp increases in inflation. Iraq’s economy is still fragile as a result of the conflict with terrorist organizations (ISIS) that drained cities and led to one of the most dangerous waves of displacement and migration inside and outside In addition to the political problems that followed the liberation operations, which were reinforced by the fragility of the political institutions in Iraq, which added the factor of continuity and permanence to the conflict in Iraq. Iraq ranks second after Afghanistan in the Global Terrorism Index 2021[15], Figure 4

 

 

Terror threats in Iraq

Figure 4

 

 

The fragility of peace in Iraq is measured through three main indicators:

The Security Apparatus, which measures the capabilities of the security services in facing life-threatening security challenges such as bombings, battles, insurgencies, terrorism, ethnic cleansing and revenge. This indicator also takes into account organized crime, drug trafficking and murder.

The Fragile States Report 2012 indicates that the fragility of the security structure has not recorded a significant improvement over the 2006 figures[16]. Figure 5

 

The structure of security threats in Iraq

Figure 5

 

 

 

The division of the political and social elites, or what is known as Factionalized Elites, which is one of the most important factors of the conflict in Iraq, as the division of the political elites affected the structural structure of the institutions. The institutions in which tasks are divided on the basis of the quota system, which leads to division in these institutions, in addition to the political stalemate, which often brings the political situation in Iraq to the brink of the abyss and affects the building of sustainable peace. International organizations concerned with measuring security fragility explain the dependence of fragile states on political elites with vertical sectarian, religious or ethnic divisions for many reasons, the most important of which is the inability to build political legitimacy acceptable to the majority of the population, which leads to the search for legitimacy through ethnic and sectarian affiliations. And Iraq has maintained the constancy of the fragility of the political elite division from 2006 to 2021[17], Figure No. 6.

 

The political elites in Iraq are divided

Figure 6

 

 

Group grievance: This indicator measures the extent of social and popular divisions. As the feeling of groups and minorities in the fragile state that they are unable to express their views or that they do not get equal opportunities to access wealth, job opportunities, the right to self-government or public self-determination. This division is the reason for provoking protests, revolutions and civil wars. In fragile states, these divisions increase with a lack of law enforcement, the rule of armed groups, and impunity. Despite the political transformations that Iraq witnessed after 2003, the sense of persecution and injustice within social groups and minorities is still fragile and threatens peacebuilding on an ongoing basis in Iraq Figure 8.

 

 

The division of groups and their grievances

Figure 7

 

 

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that the conflict in Iraq turned Iraq into a fragile country, meaning that it weakened Iraq’s ability to confront crises, and this was evident during the crisis of the Covid-19 epidemic, as health institutions collapsed and were unable to save the population, but the most dangerous is the collapse of educational institutions, services and security buffers. This has led to the exacerbation of disease, poverty and unemployment, in addition to the threat of great inflation, which dissolves in the face of political conflicts and chaos in the administration of the state. The conflicts in Iraq have not only affected the state’s ability to cope with crises, but have mainly affected the human capital, as the repeated conflicts that Iraq witnessed led to an increase in casualties and deaths among the human production forces, which created a generation of crippled workforce, not only the state was paralyzed not only armed violence but the forces of human capital are being shattered under the impact of this conflict. The conflict also destroyed the infrastructure of Iraq, which is a successive destruction. The war on Iraq in 2003 was followed by armed political violence, which led to the collapse of security in Iraqi cities, which made Iraq an easy arena for the concentration of armed groups that confronted them through the formation of a regionally supported armed militia. And so on, in order to continue the series of broken conflict that does not stop to allow the rebuilding and development of the infrastructure of Iraq. The total damage inflicted on Iraqi cities that suffered from the war on the Islamic State (ISIS) was estimated at about $45 billion in 2018[18]. So far, a full recovery has not been achieved for many of the major cities, whose infrastructure was completely destroyed, despite the efforts of the international community, and despite the fact that Iraq is an oil-producing country capable of financing reconstruction projects on its own. The truth is that Iraq does not have the funding problem that countries that have emerged from long conflicts suffer from, but it is a country in which the conflict does not stop.

 

Second, fragile institutions

 

Institutions are the important factor against which the fragility of the state is measured. Weak institutions do not lead to stumbling construction efforts and confronting crises. They also play a dual role by destroying and weakening construction and reform efforts. Although Iraq is an oil country whose revenues have allowed it to reach the middle-income classification, the performance of its institutions seems closer to low-income countries, where the institutions of education, health, economy and services in Iraq are constantly collapsing[19].

As well as the fragility includes the institutions of governance, politics, law and security in Iraq, which are supposed to lead and protect the development process, but in reality it stumbles in finding a map that joins the relationship between the parties to the political system, in addition to the fragility of democracy and democratic institutions that make Iraq’s political form conducive to conflict paths rather than stability and development. The fragile political institutions have become intentional as they feed the power of political forces and the power of the armed wings of the parties, but it draws a cycle of violence and conflict that could break the fragile peace in this country. The report of the International Cooperation Organization has identified Iraq from the table, which means the weakness of institutions as one of the main factors of Iraq’s fragility[20] (Fig. 8).

 

 

 

 

Figure 8.

 

The manifestations of corruption in the Iraqi state institutions have escalated escalatingly, without activating real mechanisms to confront it. Bribery, abuse of job authority, job negligence, embezzlement and theft of public money, extortion, nepotism, and customs evasion have become basic features of Iraqi institutions. The more mismanagement, the lower the wages, the higher the prices and the weaker the application of laws and regulations, the more the problem of corruption will worsen and deepen in the structural fabric of the institutions.

Corruption affects sustainable development by targeting institutions that are the cornerstone of any development process, and thus the fragility of institutions in Iraq led to the failure of the development process and even undermined any strategy to combat this phenomenon.

As the corruption of institutions leads to the following effects:

-Creating an imbalance in the distribution of national income through illegal mechanisms for an unfair distribution of wealth, where the wealth is seized by the forces of corruption, which are protected from political forces, economic and financial cartels, and external forces affecting the Iraqi scene.

-Employment of corrupt money The corrupt money in Iraq is often transferred abroad, so it does not enter the economic cycle blood money and local production, which leads to depriving Iraq of investing those funds that are one of its rights.

– Consolidation of unbalanced development, where if this corrupt money is used to the internal economic cycle, it invests in unproductive consumer projects and has little effect on economic development[21]. Therefore, there is a development in the retail trade sectors and the construction of commercial complexes in major cities in exchange for the erosion of investment in industries and projects Infrastructure .

Corruption in institutions leads to an increase in the cost of investments due to the confusion of regulations and the absence of transparency, and thus reduces the efficiency of capital, which leads to the flight of good investment from Iraq. Drugs and weapons. After 2003, the fragility of institutions contributed to Iraq becoming a favourable environment for investment in illegal trade on the one hand and money laundering on the other[22].

The fragility of institutions in Iraq is the decisive factor in the fragility of comprehensive development and the deviation of development goals and policies, as in the shadow of corrupt and fragile institutions, the goals set for development policy cannot be reached, and inevitably contributes to the deterioration of demographic, social and economic characteristics.

 

 

Third, the fragile economy

The relationship is reciprocal between the economy and fragility and weakness in any country. Certainly, the fragile state is the state that is incapable of formulating efficient and sustainable economic policies that achieve economic development. For a long time, I was unable to build the foundations for a strong national economy and a realistic economic philosophy. The truth is that the second opinion is closer to reality.

Iraq is classified as a country with a high middle income, but with this it is one of the weakest countries in terms of economic growth, and the reason is due to the outbreak of conflict and violence and the accompanying contraction in the economy, endangering livelihoods, increasing poverty and weakening per capita income[23]. Where poverty rose from 9.18% in 2014 to about 30.7 in 2021[24]. The United Nations Development Program also indicates that 96.31 of the Iraqi workforce are poor workers whose daily income does not exceed $10.3[25]

The situation of sustainable fragility in Iraq was entrenched by the factors of state failure, which exacerbated after 2003 with a complete collapse of institutions, which was not avoided by building productive institutions for development. Consequently, the inability of policy makers and leaders of political parties to build governance institutions or lay down development plans or strategies for renaissance and comprehensive construction, which led to the inability to achieve comprehensive improvement in the fragility of the economic structure between the years 2006-2021.

The fragility of the Iraqi economy 2006-2021

Figure 9

 

 

The fragility of Iraq’s economic structure is the main element that will sooner or later turn into collapses in stability and make Iraq vulnerable to the threats of internal and external crises. Although Iraq is one of the most important oil-producing countries, and it depends mainly on oil to build wealth, which allowed Iraq to be one of the middle-income countries, but with this, many aspects of economic life in Iraq are very similar to the poor and low-income countries[26]. Poverty rates have risen at record rates in the last three years.

 

 

Figure 10[27]

 

 

The reason is that the fragility of the economic structure in Iraq has paralyzed the contribution of the wealth obtained from oil, and this wealth is squandered in spending on the huge public sector that Iraq suffers from, in addition to the corruption of institutions that consume Iraq’s revenues and economic returns. Which led to the similarity of Iraq’s socioeconomic indicators with those of poor countries that do not contain any source of natural wealth. Figure 11[28]

 

 

 

The similarity between Iraq’s indicators in many social and economic dimensions with low-income and fragile countries

Figure 11[29]

 

 

3-Fragility in the application

The previous indicators that were mentioned confirm that Iraq is a fragile state, but the weakness has become offset by the lack of seriousness of government action to extricate Iraq from the reality of fragility. Rather, the factors of fragility have become an integral part of the structure of the political system, and there is a reciprocal dependency relationship between fragility and the survival of the power and influence of political groups and elites in Iraq. . And when fragility becomes part of the structure of the system, when the state turns from fragility to failure, failed states are those states whose fragility has been exaggerated to the extent that the decision maker no longer possesses the necessary tools to remedy the imbalances or that he does not even have the independence of the political decision that allows him to make adjustments The required radical reforms, and Iraq is indeed one of the countries in which one of the most important causes of fragility is the factor of external interference or what is known as External Intervention, whether by neighboring regional countries or by international powers. Figure 12

 

External income in Iraq for the period from 2006-2021

Figure 12

 

External interference and its ability to influence the political decision in Iraq is not the only practical application that has resulted from the reality of fragility, as the events that have happened in Iraq during the last 17 years have deepened the realization that Iraq is not only a fragile state, but is also a state that suffers from a failure in building buffers for disasters and crises that It occurs at home or takes place in other places in the world (the definition of the Organization for International Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED)[30]. Iraq has gone through a complex crisis syndrome, which means that crises carry three dimensions at one time, which is what actually happened at the end of 2019 until the end of 2020, when Iraq went through a crisis Political, health, and financial at the same time, which led to a deep regression in the sustainable development plans that Iraq desperately needed after the devastation that unfolded. A right to the cities liberated from the Islamic State (ISIS) and the humanitarian setbacks that accompanied the waves of mass displacement from the liberated cities. Figure 13[31].

 

 

Figure 13

 

 

The most important crises and disasters that Iraq was unable to confront and that led to the strengthening of the reality of fragility in it are:

 

 

 

First: terrorism

Terrorist groups are a global phenomenon. Iraq was not the land that exports or produces these terrorist groups, but the fragility of the security structure that we talked about previously coincided with the division of the political elites and the political crises that passed through Iraq and weakened its ability to build peace, which led to the collapse of the state’s ability to control on its sovereign borders, it became safe corridors for the movement and escape of these terrorist groups, which in turn woven intertwined relations with the regional forces surrounding Iraq, which have an influence on its political decision[32].

The fragility of the security structure and in parallel with the fragility of politics made the catastrophe of global terrorism spread to Iraq until the Iraqi cities fell successively in the hands of those groups that were able to turn Iraq into the main centre of their presence in the Middle East.

Even after Iraq succeeded in eliminating these terrorist groups with the help of the international effort, the factors of fragility that led to this catastrophe still exist and threaten to cause a similar collapse, especially if the process of rebuilding the thought and doctrine of security institutions and political institutions is not carried out in the way that the goal is Building sustainable peace in Iraq.

 

Second, the popular protests

The disasters and crises that Iraq witnessed during the wars of liberation from ISIS, and the political elites in Iraq promised that they are determined to political reform and that they will work to address the dependencies of weakness and fragility in order to prevent their occurrence in the previous mistakes that led to the collapse of security in Iraq. But it seems that those promises that I made to the international community and to the people exhausted by the catastrophe of the war against ISIS, were nothing but ink on paper. As these elites were unable to comprehend the magnitude of the changes that occurred in Iraqi society, but rather insisted on continuing their struggle and political division, Factionalized Elites, which is one of the most important factors of the conflict in Iraq.

And in October 2019, the spark of popular protests erupted in Iraq, which was one of the basic rights guaranteed by the constitution to the people within the framework of the democratic system that was established in Iraq after 2003. However, the government authorities faced these protests using excessive repression, which turned this popular movement into a massive revolution that swept all Iraqi cities and in which the various groups of the people participated in an unprecedented state of political awareness and popular union on the need to bring about a comprehensive change in the structure of the political system, which is no longer leaders to produce No real fix.

The insistence of the masses to continue the protest and sit-in was countered by the insistence of the political elites to use repression, killing, arrest, absence, torture and intimidation, which claimed the lives of dozens of young people, and the disappearance and torture of dozens in cases of violation of civil liberties and rights that have not yet been decided upon despite government pledges.

The popular protests led to a deep political crisis and the collapse of the political contract in Iraq, in addition to the collapse of the legitimacy of the government, revealing the extent of the fragility of political institutions and their inability to remedy these types of events within the framework of the constitution. It also revealed the fragility of state institutions that were unable to find solutions to the collapse of their legitimacy after militias and armed groups took control of the security decision and began declaring a street war against a popular peaceful protest movement. This reinforced the social and popular division that felt persecution and injustice, which we previously knew as group grievance, which is from The most important factors of fragility that Iraq suffers from.

 

Third: the COVID-19 pandemic

The Corona epidemic was a global catastrophe that could not bear its impact and impact on the largest countries in the world. As public health systems collapsed in the most important countries in the world, the accumulation of injuries and death records led to a complete paralysis of health systems, the economy and institutions.

As for Iraq, the pandemic struck the country to eliminate the dilapidated health infrastructure, which has not undergone any significant reform since 2003. Then soon the confusion and turmoil of educational institutions and service institutions left Iraq at the mercy of the institutions of the international community, which fortunately managed the global crisis through a series of measures to save the poor, weak and fragile countries.

However, the other terrifying face of the epidemic disaster was the effects of the pandemic on oil and energy prices, which collapsed to record numbers. Because Iraq does not have any buffers for this type of disaster of humanitarian and economic dimensions, the economic systems in Iraq collapsed almost completely simultaneously with the escalation of the political crisis in the country. Iraq was forced to rush to the international lending organizations and request emergency economic aid, such as that requested by poor countries that do not have any natural resources or resources.

The global epidemic disaster led to the decline of the Iraqi economy, and the government imposed emergency economic treatments that were recommended by international economic institutions, which should have been accompanied by government decisions that expand spending on social security and support for the poor and affected segments, but this did not happen from what happened The problem of income disparity and the expansion of poverty in Iraq.

 

Fourth: the war on Ukraine

 

The war crisis in Ukraine and the repercussions of the international conflict between Russia and the Western bloc is in fact a global crisis that greatly affects global peace and security, as it affects the world’s economic systems, especially since the Western bloc is determined to follow the policy of stifling economic sanctions against Russia and punish countries that participate with Russia In military operations in Ukraine. The war crisis in Ukraine has greatly affected assi It protects stocks and bonds in the world and on global supply chains, and the most dangerous effect is their impact on the rise in oil and gas prices to unprecedented record prices.

As for Iraq, it is not a party to the war in any way, and it is also an oil-producing and exporting country, in addition to being a country that burns gas accompanying the oil supply in a policy that successive Iraqi governments did not find any logical explanation for except Iraq’s desire not to be a competitor in the gas market in the region The Middle East, especially for regional countries such as Iran and Qatar.

Although the war in Europe could hide behind it great opportunities for neutral and oil-rich countries in the Middle East, Iraq is collapsing under the weight of rising global inflation and rising prices of basic commodities in an upward manner that threatens the poor and limited segments. In addition to the rise in foreign exchange rates compared to the dinar, which is the step he took Iraq is in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis to remedy the collapse of Iraq’s reserves of cash and as a recommendation from the International Monetary Fund. But the Iraqi government did not take any corresponding decisions to support the poor classes, which exposed the economic situation to the utmost degree of fragility, whose features began to appear with the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, which hits the global economy and threatens the crisis of stagflation in the global economy.

Crises occur in today’s world quickly and successively, but the state’s task is to make maximum efforts so that the crises do not touch the reality of the daily life of people, especially the weak classes, because these classes represent the basis that creates the productive forces. It will deepen and the repair operations will become more complex and more expensive. This is exactly what is happening in Iraq, which is revolving in cycles of crises without the slightest plan or strategy for stopping or deep treatment, and policy makers prefer to use local anesthesia injections, which cannot be relied upon in dealing with crises and major disasters.

 

 

4-The way out of fragility

 

Jose Saramago in the novel The Blind One says (When the blind tries to get over himself, he only succeeds in breaking his nose). This saying sums up one of the most important shortcomings of fragile states, which is their inability to see the problem specifically, yet it develops solutions and suggestions to get out of the state of fragility. However, developing solutions without specifying the origin of the problem or acknowledging its existence in the first place exposes the development efforts in it to loss and collapse. For example, many Central African countries were convinced that the lack of democracy in them is the basis of their fragility and failure, but experiences have proven that democracy was not the solution in these countries, but rather it reinforced instability and multiplied crises, especially with the continued existence of bad institutions that turned democracy into a means To consolidate the power of the corrupt elites, many of these countries returned to the era of bloody military coups, as is the case in Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali[33].

 

Iraq, although it is not a poor country, but it is one of the fragile countries in which the danger of fragility lies, that stability can collapse in it at any time. However, there is no clear identification of the state of fragility of the successive elected governments that ruled Iraq, which recognize that there are imbalances in the political, institutional and economic structure. The governments that have governed Iraq since 2003 refuse to recognize that they are fragile governments that produce the reality of fragility and that they do not have practical solutions and do not have the ability to develop long-term strategies or commit to long-term strategies. The elected governments in Iraq are engaged in a power struggle and politics and believe that this conflict is what will lead to reforming institutions, the economy and crises, but with the deepening of political divisions at the beginning of the formation of each new government, everyone quickly discovers that attempts to reform the government led to new crises that reduced Iraq’s ability to develop plans to confront Disasters, building buffers for crises, or at least benefiting from resources in the treatment of damage.

 

To get out of the reality of fragility, Iraq needs a comprehensive strategy for reform, but this strategy in a country where development plans are still completely managed by the state, will end in paralysis as governments have changed rapidly in Iraq for 17 years, and they are governments that are born fragile and there is no cumulative building in reform but rather processes Demolition, rebuilding, and so on, until the general foundational rules of any development process in Iraq have vanished[34].

Thus, the comprehensive strategy to combat fragility and vulnerability needs three main pillars:

First: sovereignty

Iraq needs to strengthen the principle of state sovereignty and the independence of political decision, as it is one of the most important foundations adopted by countries in dealing with the problem of the fragile state. It means the supreme political authority of the state, and there are two main aspects of sovereignty, which are internal sovereignty and external sovereignty, and internal sovereignty refers to the legal authority of individuals or private associations in the state, while external authority is the independence of the state and is not subject to any interference and authority from outside.

Iraq needs to strengthen the following components of state sovereignty:

1- Sustainability, meaning that the sovereignty of the state is a continuous and permanent matter and is not dependent on the form of the government or the conditions of its formation.

2- Exclusivity, ie the state is the only source of the decision, that is, no party is allowed to interfere in the ruling or political decision.

3- Justice, i.e. strengthening the image of the state as a legal authority capable of achieving the provisions of the law in a comprehensive manner that does not exclude any political party or group.

Absolute, meaning that the democratically elected ruler has the right to impose the absolute sovereignty of the state as long as it is within the framework of the constitution and the law. There is no right for any party to assault the authority of the state or break the constitutional and legal decisions taken by the state.

 

Second, the private sector

The private sector plays a pivotal role in the development of fragile states. Strengthening the private sector and involving it in development has helped many countries that were described as fragile and weak, such as Brazil and Indonesia and India[35]. The private sector not only plays a supporting role for the state in development processes, but it can also be the most successful alternative to institutions, especially in countries where institutions need demolishing and rebuilding, where the private sector can contribute to filling the shortfall and deficit in institutions. But the private sector in Iraq has been neglected for decades, and the idea of ​​a totalitarian state has become a well-established idea in the Iraqi mind, in contrast to similar experiences in the region such as Egypt, Morocco and the Arab Gulf states, where the private sector was able to develop and become a pivotal pillar in economic performance.

Rebuilding the private sector so that its role is essential in development requires the state to reform law enforcement systems and issue legislation that protects the private sector and protects individuals from exploitation, as well as activating effective governance systems and developing control and transparency systems so that the private sector is not a source of corrupt political money.

Third, transparency and oversight

 

Transparency contributes to improving the weakness and fragility of institutions, which is the essence of the faltering development in Iraq. Since the successive governments since 2003 have put transparency, justice and fighting corruption as one of their goals, but this goal quickly collapses under the weight of severe political division and immaturity of government standards that address the problem of weakness and corruption in institutions.

Activating transparency systems will be the effective treatment that contributes to developing the operational performance of institutions, whether in the public sector or even at the level of private sector companies. Transparency systems mean that the state administration is transparent, i.e. that the organs of government administration and local administrations work in accordance with court systems, provided that workers and citizens are informed of these systems and the details are not hidden or transactions are obscured in order not to be accused of preference and to be capable of continuous development and improvement[36].

 

Management through transparency can improve the performance of institutions through the following mechanisms[37]:

1– Increasing the supervisory role of the supervisory bodies before the share of each sector in the general budget is set. In addition to its oversight role during and after approving the budget, and this is achieved through the regulatory bodies obligating government institutions to provide them with documents related to supply contracts, pledges, works and services, especially those documents related to limited and general competition, direct insurance, and the draft contract before signing it by the parties, in order for the regulatory bodies to show Its opinion on these contracts and undertakings, provided that the supervisory bodies finish performing that task within a specified period.

2- Clearly defining the tasks of the various oversight bodies, including the oversight bodies of some ministries and oversight and investigation bodies, in order to prevent an overlap in the competencies of these bodies and to eliminate the attempt of some bodies to carry out some competencies that go beyond what is stipulated in the work system of those bodies. This is done through a high-level committee of representatives of these regulatory bodies, in which the competencies of each of these regulatory bodies are precisely defined.

3- The necessity for the regulatory bodies in Iraq to adopt modern trends in the areas of control, for example, oversight in light of the use of computers, technical development, and the method of comprehensive control under which all performance systems are monitored, taking into account the intertwined relationships between those systems, which increase the ability of those bodies to provide Decision makers are provided with the information necessary to make sound and effective decisions.

4- Ensure the proper application of the laws and regulations that regulate work with transparency and integrity in Iraqi institutions, highlighting the legal gaps in the law of the administrative and financial system of the state and working to fill them by developing and proposing legislation, laws and regulations that ensure access to transparency and integrity and not obstruct legislative accountability.

5- All Iraqi political forces must agree on the importance of the rule of law and the independence of oversight bodies, and that transparency and justice be tangible actions for these forces on the ground in order to reduce the gap between policies and field practices, as well as that the commitment of this force to the law and the protection of the robustness of institutions is the criterion of its political legitimacy. Without the support of political forces, transparency and oversight systems cannot be activated. Rather, they will be mere electoral slogans that collapse with the formation of the government.

 

 

DR.RANA KHALID

Senior Researchers

ranaifpmc@outlook.com

 

 

Reference 

 

 

  • المرسي السيد الحجازي،تكاليف اجتماعية للفساد،مجلة المستقبل العربي،بيروت:مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية ،العدد :266 ،2001  ،ص 19.
  • الإدارة بالشفافية الطريق للتنمية والاصلاح الادارى وتطوير المنظمات. الإدارة بالشفافية الطريق للتنمية والاصلاح الإداري وتطوير المنظمات – د. سامى الطوخى – استشارى التدريب فى العلوم الادارية والقانونية والقضائية. (
  • البرنامج الوطني للعمل اللائق العراق: التعافي والإصلاح. (2020, February 17). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.ilo.org/beirut/country/WCMS_808914/lang–ar/index.htm
  • التخطيط تكشف عن انخفاض نسبة الفقر خلال العام 2021 – عاجل. موقع نبض. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://nabd.com/
  • عبد الرحيم احمد بلال ،الشفافية .. الفساد والتنمية مفهوم وأنواع الفساد ومجالاته،صحيفة سودانايل الالكترونية، 2004.
  • مجموعة البنك الدولي ، ما هي الدولة الهشة؟. مدونات البنك الدولي. (n.d.). Retrieved January 13, 2022, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/ar/voices/developmenttalk/what-fragile-state
  • مجموعة البنك الدولي، النهوض من واقع الهشاشة: كيف يمكن للعراق تحقيق النمو والاستقرار من خلال تنويع النشاط الاقتصادي. World Bank. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/press-release/2020/09/30/breaking-out-of-fragility-how-iraq-can-turn-economic-diversification-into-growth-and-stability .p2
  • d.). Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://kenanaonline.com/users/toukhy/posts/71386
  • ماذا تعني الانقلابات العسكرية في أفريقيا؟. اندبندنت عربية. (2021, September 18). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.independentarabia.com/node.
  • نعوم تشومسكي 2007،الدولة الفاشلة :إساءة استعمال القوة والتعدي على الديمقراطية ، ترجمة :سامي الكعكي ، دار الكتاب العربي ،بيروت .

 

  • CPIA Africa: Overall CPIA score: The World Bank. World Bank. (n.d.). Retrieved January 18, 2022, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/cpia/cluster/overall-cpia-score
  • Collier, P. (2022, March 9). A new approach to state fragility. Brookings. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-new-approach-to-state-fragility/
  • (2017, February 5). Editor. مركز الروابط للدراسات الاستراتيجية والسياسية. Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://rawabetcenter.com/archives/40373
  • Further details on the content of (and methodology underpinning) the ‘Failed States Index’ is available at
  • Longley, R. (2020, July 27). What is a failed state? definition and examples. ThoughtCo. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-a-failed-state-definition-and-examples-5072546
  • Pickering, H. (2014, July 1). Terminology twist: From failed states to fragile states. The Strategist. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/terminology-twist-from-failed-states-to-fragile-states/
  • OESD, State Of Fragility2021, http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/countries/IRQ/
  • The IMF and fragile states. (n.d.). Retrieved January 13, 2022, from https://ieo.imf.org/~/media/IEO/Files/evaluations/completed/04-03-2018-the-imf-and-fragile-states/fs-report-web.ashx ,p9-10
  • States of fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions: En. OECD. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2022, from https://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2015-9789264227699-en.htm
  • The Qog Institute. University of Gothenburg. (n.d.). Retrieved January 18, 2022, from https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government#:~:text=The%20Quality%20of%20Government%20(QoG,at%20the%20University%20of%20Gothenburg.
  • The fund for peace. Fragile States Index. (n.d.). Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://fragilestatesindex.org
  • s.-iran proxy competition in Iraq. February 2020 (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/U.S.-Iran_Proxy_Competition_in_Iraq_FINAL_XZulx1C.pdf
  • Sovereignty: Meaning and characteristics of sovereignty. Political Science Notes. (2014, August 9). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.politicalsciencenotes.com/essay/sovereignty-meaning-and-characteristics-of-sovereignty/254.

 

[1] ما هي الدولة الهشة؟. مدونات البنك الدولي. (n.d.). Retrieved January 13, 2022, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/ar/voices/developmenttalk/what-fragile-state

[2] World Bank Group. (2020, September 30). النهوض من واقع الهشاشة: كيف يمكن للعراق تحقيق النمو والاستقرار من خلال تنويع النشاط الاقتصادي. World Bank. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/press-release/2020/09/30/breaking-out-of-fragility-how-iraq-can-turn-economic-diversification-into-growth-and-stability .p2

 

[3] Pickering, H. (2014, July 1). Terminology twist: From failed states to fragile states. The Strategist. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/terminology-twist-from-failed-states-to-fragile-states/

[4] The IMF and fragile states. (n.d.). Retrieved January 13, 2022, from https://ieo.imf.org/~/media/IEO/Files/evaluations/completed/04-03-2018-the-imf-and-fragile-states/fs-report-web.ashx ,p9-10

 

[5] انظر: States of fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions: En. OECD. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2022, from https://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2015-9789264227699-en.htm

[6] ويتكون هذا البرنامج من 16 معيارا مجمعة في أربع مجموعات متساوية الترجيح: الإدارة الاقتصادية، والسياسات الهيكلية، وسياسات الإدماج الاجتماعي والإنصاف، وإدارة القطاع العام ومؤسساته. وبالنسبة لكل معيار من المعايير ال 16، تصنف البلدان على مقياس من 1 (منخفض) إلى 6 (مرتفع). وتتوقف الدرجات على مستوى الأداء في سنة معينة تقيم وفقا للمعايير، وليس على التغيرات في الأداء مقارنة بالسنة السابقة. وتعتمد التصنيفات على السياسات والأداء الفعليين، وليس على الوعود أو النوايا. وفي بعض الحالات، يمكن أن تمثل تدابير مثل سن تشريعات محددة إجراء هاما يستحق النظر فيه. غير أن الطريقة التي ينبغي بها إدراج هذه الإجراءات في التصنيفات تقيم بعناية، لأن تنفيذ التشريعات هو الذي يحدد في نهاية المطاف مدى تأثيرها. انظر :

CPIA Africa: Overall CPIA score: The World Bank. World Bank. (n.d.). Retrieved January 18, 2022, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/cpia/cluster/overall-cpia-score

[7] Further details on the content of (and methodology underpinning) the ‘Failed States Index’ is available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/24/2013_failed_states_interactive_map. The FSI’s 12 component indicators are: demographic pressures; refugees/IDPs; group grievance; human flight; uneven development; economic decline; delegitimization of the state; public services; human rights; security apparatus; fractionalized elites; external intervention. Though these formal ‘indexes’ of relatively recent provenance, it is interesting to note which countries were deemed ‘failed states’ (at least in the academic literature) 20 years ago that now are not (e.g., Cambodia)

 

[8]Ibid

[9]مؤشر جودة الحوكمة QoG  هو معهد بحثي تم تأسيسه من قبل البروفيسور بو روثستين والبروفيسور سورين هولمبرغ. وهو معهد بحثي مستقل تابع لقسم العلوم السياسية بجامعة جوتنبرج. يضم المعهد حوالي 30 باحثًا يقومون بإجراء وتعزيز البحوث حول أسباب وعواقب وطبيعة الحكم الرشيد ونوعية الحكومة .

The Qog Institute. University of Gothenburg. (n.d.). Retrieved January 18, 2022, from https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government#:~:text=The%20Quality%20of%20Government%20(QoG,at%20the%20University%20of%20Gothenburg.

 

[10] نعوم تشومسكي 2007،الدولة الفاشلة :إساءة استعمال القوة والتعدي على الديمقراطية ، ترجمة :سامي الكعكي ، دار الكتاب العربي ،بيروت .

 

[11] Longley, R. (2020, July 27). What is a failed state? definition and examples. ThoughtCo. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-a-failed-state-definition-and-examples-5072546

[12] OESD, State Of Fragility2021, http://www3.compareyourcountry.org/states-of-fragility/countries/IRQ/

[13] The fund for peace. Fragile States Index. (n.d.). Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://fragilestatesindex.org/

 

[14] Ibid

 

[15] Global terrorism index. Vision of Humanity. (2022, March 3). Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/

[16] The fund for peace. Fragile States Index. (n.d.). Retrieved March 17, 2022,Ibid

Figure 5

 

[17] The fund for peace. Fragile States Index. (n.d.). Retrieved March 17, 2022,Ibid

[18] انظر: تقريرمجموعة البنك الدولي 2018، العراق إعادة البناء والاستثمار ج2:تقييم الاضرار والاحتياجات للمحافظات المتضررة, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/160691520000589687/pdf/123631-v2-ARABIC-OUO-9-Part-2-Arabic.pdf

 

 

[19] World Bank Group. (2020, September 30). النهوض من واقع الهشاشة: كيف يمكن للعراق تحقيق النمو والاستقرار من خلال تنويع النشاط الاقتصادي. World Bank. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/press-release/2020/09/30/breaking-out-of-fragility-how-iraq-can-turn-economic-diversification-into-growth-and-stability

 

[20] World Bank Group. (2020, September 30). النهوض من واقع الهشاشة: كيف يمكن للعراق تحقيق النمو والاستقرار من خلال تنويع النشاط الاقتصادي. World Bank. Retrieved February 8, 2022, from https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/news/press-release/2020/09/30/breaking-out-of-fragility-how-iraq-can-turn-economic-diversification-into-growth-and-stability

 

 

[21] عبد الرحيم احمد بلال ،الشفافية .. الفساد والتنمية مفهوم وأنواع الفساد ومجالاته،صحيفة سودانايل الالكترونية، 2004.

[22] Editor. (2017, February 5). Editor. مركز الروابط للدراسات الاستراتيجية والسياسية. Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://rawabetcenter.com/archives/40373

 

[23] GELBARD Enrique, DELECHAT Corinne, Ulrich JACOBY, et autres

(2015), Accroitre la Résilience dans les États Fragiles d’Afrique

Subsaharienne. Fonds Monétaire International, département Afrique,

Washington.

 

[24] تصريح المتحدث باسم وزارة التخطيط عبد الزهرة الهنداوي في تصريح لوكالة الأنباء العراقية (واع)

انظر:التخطيط تكشف عن انخفاض نسبة الفقر خلال العام 2021 – عاجل. موقع نبض. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://nabd.com/

 

[25] البرنامج الوطني للعمل اللائق العراق: التعافي والإصلاح. (2020, February 17). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.ilo.org/beirut/country/WCMS_808914/lang–ar/index.htm

 

 

[26] World Bank Group. (2020, September 30). النهوض من واقع الهشاشة: مذكرة اقتصادية للتنوع والنمو في العراق (ملخص تنفيذي). World Bank. Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://www.albankaldawli.org/ar/country/iraq/publication/breaking-out-of-fragility-a-country-economic-memorandum-for-diversification-and-growth-in-iraq

[27] وزارة التخطيط العراقية.2021 ، التقرير الطوعي الوطني الثاني للمتحقق من اهداف التنمية المستدامة 2021، العراق والعودة الى المسار التنموي ،ص32  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/279412021_VNR_Report_Iraq.pdf

[28] World Bank Group. (2020, September 30).Ibed

 

[29] February 2020 u.s.-iran proxy competition in Iraq. (n.d.). Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/U.S.-Iran_Proxy_Competition_in_Iraq_FINAL_XZulx1C.pdf .

 

[30] CPIA Africa: Overall CPIA score: The World Bank. World Bank. (n.d.). Retrieved January 18, 2022, Ibed.

 

[31] وزارة التخطيط العراقية.2021 ، التقرير الطوعي الوطني الثاني للمتحقق من اهداف التنمية المستدامة 2021، نفس المصدر السابق ،ص24

 

[32] u.s.-iran proxy competition in Iraq,Ibed

[33] ماذا تعني الانقلابات العسكرية في أفريقيا؟. اندبندنت عربية. (2021, September 18). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.independentarabia.com/node/

[34] Sovereignty: Meaning and characteristics of sovereignty. Political Science Notes. (2014, August 9). Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.politicalsciencenotes.com/essay/sovereignty-meaning-and-characteristics-of-sovereignty/254

 

[35] Collier, P. (2022, March 9). A new approach to state fragility. Brookings. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-new-approach-to-state-fragility/

 

[36] المرسي السيد الحجازي،تكاليف اجتماعية للفساد،مجلة المستقبل العربي،بيروت:مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية ،العدد :266 ،2001  ،ص 19.

 

[37] انظر : الإدارة بالشفافية الطريق للتنمية والاصلاح الادارى وتطوير المنظمات. الإدارة بالشفافية الطريق للتنمية والاصلاح الادارى وتطوير المنظمات – د. سامى الطوخى – استشارى التدريب فى العلوم الادارية والقانونية والقضائية. (n.d.). Retrieved March 17, 2022, from https://kenanaonline.com/users/toukhy/posts/71386

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